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CYNICAL REALISM AND JUDICIAL FANTASY 
DANIEL HINKLE
 
ABSTRACT 
Recent scholarship on the workings of the court system has cast doubt on 
the ability of judges to make neutral, unbiased decisions. Statistical 
analyses of judicial decisions have identified a sizable minority of 
decisions that appear to be influenced by a judge’s ideology. These 
findings have fueled a “neutrality crisis” regarding the courts system’s 
ability to live up to its role as a neutral arbiter. Naïve realism accounts for 
this ideological bias by suggesting that judges, as humans, are subject to 
the same sort of perception biases as anyone else and that these 
unconscious biases can affect their decisions. By locating the source of the 
“neutrality crisis” in the unconscious, these scholars seek to account for 
the findings of the political scientists, while maintaining the legitimacy of 
the current institutional structure. However, this response is cynical. 
Cynicism anticipates the revelation of some real truth that undermines the 
ideology supporting the social fabric of society. By framing politically 
derived decisions as a product of naïve realism and offering advice on 
how to obscure unconscious judicial bias, legal scholars are employing 
cynical reasoning to maintain an illusion of neutrality while justifying 
non-neutral decision-making. This cynical reasoning sacrifices long-term 
“Rule of Law” interests for the sake of short-term political stability—an 
unnecessary and detrimental tradeoff. This Note seeks to isolate this issue 
and offer an alternative solution to the neutrality crisis informed by the 
latest findings from cognitive psychology and behavior economics. Judges 
must cultivate an independent ideology that is self-conscious of any 
personal biases and seeks to overcome those biases so that they may 
engage legal questions with a more detached, reasoned, and just decision-
making process. This method will lead to more neutral, unbiased decisions 
from the bench and strengthen the rule of law in the United States.  
 
 
  Editor in Chief, Washington University Jurisprudence Review; J.D. (2013), Washington 
University School of Law 2013. I would like to thank John Drobak and Pauline Kim for their 
insightful feedback and helpful comments. I would also like to thank Sarah Nierenberg, John 
Brubaker, and Spencer Reynolds for their editorial work and support.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The way judges decide cases is profoundly important to the way 
society is organized and the perceived legitimacy of the law in a society. It 
is ingrained in our collective conscious that one of the most fundamental 
forms of freedom that liberal constitutionalism secures for its citizens is 
the promise that government will not impose legal obligations that 
presuppose adherence to a moral or political orthodoxy.
1
 In the United 
States, institutional scaffolds do much to structure the decision-making 
logic in a particular way that seeks to ensure this neutrality. However, 
recent scholarship on the workings of the court system has called this 
presupposition into serious doubt. Statistical analyses of judicial decisions 
from the field of “judicial politics” have identified a sizable minority of 
 
 
 1. Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court 2010 Term—Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated 
Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 (2011). See also W. 
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If there is any fixed star in our 
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in 
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion . . . .”).
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decisions that appear to be influenced by the judge’s ideology.2 These 
findings have fueled a neutrality crisis regarding the courts system’s 
ability to live up to its role as a neutral arbiter.
3
  
This crisis first sparked a dialogue about whether judges were 
consciously abdicating this responsibility to neutrality and imposing their 
ideological preferences on society. The so-called “attitudinal model” 
posits “judicial decisionmaking as determined by the attitudes or 
preferences of individual judges, whose votes in particular cases reflect 
their sincere policy preferences largely unconstrained by legal precedent.”4 
In this view, the Law
5
 is reduced to a means for implementing the policy 
preferences of individual judges. The use of the “Law as a Means to an 
End” is a serious charge that opens the judiciary to the charge of being a 
political branch—a charge that has the potential for undermining the rule 
of law and our system of governance.
6
  
This view has been successfully transcended by a law and psychology 
movement that has classified this sort of decision-making as the product of 
naïve realism
7
 and motivated cognition.
8
 These theories posit that, while a 
judge’s individual policy preferences may affect judicial decision-making 
in hard cases, this sort of biased, ideologically-driven decision-making is 
not evidence of judicial manipulation. Rather it is because the law does not 
supply answers to all questions, judges must fill in the gaps, and judges are 
humans who are subject to the same sort of perception biases as anyone 
else. Any potential disagreement regarding how the judge interpreted the 
law is a product of differing subjective perceptions—not objective 
evidence of judicial manipulation. While it is argued that this bias still 
undermines judicial impartiality, proponents counter that, even if any 
unconscious judicial beliefs do affect their decision-making capabilities, 
there is nothing we can do about it and therefore we should not be 
 
 
 2. See Bryan D. Lammon, What We Talk About When We Talk About Ideology: Judicial 
Politics Scholarship and Naive Legal Realism, 83 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 231, 235 (2009). 
 3. Kahan, supra note 1, at 4–6 (describing the “neutrality crisis”). 
 4. See Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (2007). See also 
JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 
REVISITED 92–94 (2002) (elaborating and defending the “attitudinal model,” which holds that 
Supreme Court decisions reflect ideological attitudes and the values of the Justices).
 
 5. I use the capitalized “Law” to refer to law writ large—as in the absolute the concept of the 
Law (which, by no means, is fully defined but I take the basic assumption that everyone has some idea 
as to what the Law is in an abstract understanding). I use the lowercase “law” when referring to a 
particular legal regime or law on the books.  
 6. See generally BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END (2006).
 
 7. See Lammon, supra note 2. 
 
 8. See Kahan, supra note 1, at 6–7.
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concerned.
9
 Instead, scholars should focus on finding ways to obfuscute 
any ideological bias influencing the judge’s decision. Thus, naive realism 
seeks to account for the findings of the political scientists, while 
maintaining the legitimacy of the current institutional structure.  
This response is cynical. Cynicism anticipates the revelation of some 
real truth that undermines the ideology supporting the social fabric of 
society. It accounts for the distance between “reality as it truly is” and the 
“social reality as determined by ideology” so as to render the revelation 
impotent.
10
 Cynicism is a prop to the political order, protecting it against 
the “new knowledge” that constantly assails the symbolic-institutional 
structure that orders social reality. In this case, by framing politically 
derived decisions as a product of naïve realism and offering advice on 
how to obscure unconscious judicial bias, legal scholars are employing 
cynical reasoning to maintain the illusion of neutrality. This cynical 
reasoning sacrifices long-term “Rule of Law” interests in the name of 
short-term political stability—an unnecessary and detrimental tradeoff. 
The goal of this Note is twofold. First, it attempts to illustrate that the 
naïve realist response to the charges that judges are politicians in robes has 
been cynical. Second, it explores the implications of this cynicism in the 
development of a coherent solution to the “neutrality crisis” facing the 
court system today. As an initial matter, this Note frames the neutrality 
crisis as a crisis on two fronts: one, the charge of the informed-academic 
community that judges do not decide cases neutrally, and two, the charge 
of the polity that judges do not decide cases neutrally. The Note goes on to 
illustrate how the cynical response offered by legal academics works well 
to address the charge from the polity while neglecting the academics. 
These problems pose a long-term threat to the sustainability of our 
political order. In addition, the Note draws lessons from cognitive 
psychology—particularly the work of Daniel Kahneman—to show that 
judges do not need to be cynical about decision-making. I hope to provide 
judges with concrete advice on how they may create an independent 
ideology that is self-conscious of their innate ideological stance so that 
they may engage legal questions with a more detached, reasoned, and just 
decision-making process.   
 
 
 9. See TAMANAHA, supra note 6, at 242 (“Nothing can be done about the subconscious springs 
of human intellect”).
 
 10. SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, THE SUBLIME OBJECT OF IDEOLOGY 28 (1989) [hereinafter ŽIŽEK 
IDEOLOGY]. 
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II. IDEOLOGY, OR SIE WISSEN DAS NICHT, ABER SIE TUN ES 
 If a man is offered a fact which goes against his instincts, he will 
scrutinize it closely, and unless the evidence is overwhelming, he 
will refuse to believe it.  
 If, on the other hand, he is offered something which affords a 
reason for acting in accordance to his instincts, he will accept it 
even on the slightest evidence. 
—Bertrand Russell 
Ideologies are “intellectual efforts to rationalize the behavioral pattern 
of individuals and groups.”11 There are three basic aspects to ideology. 
First, ideology is worldview that simplifies decision-making.
12
 Second, 
this worldview is “inextricably interwoven with moral and ethical 
judgments about the fairness of the world.”13 Third, individuals alter their 
ideological perspective when their experiences are inconsistent with their 
ideologies.
14
 Hence, an individual’s ideology is that individual’s subjective 
perceptions about the way the world is and how it ought to be. It serves as 
a heuristic to guide behavior and attitudes to novel situations and everyday 
life. 
The content of ideology is the background framework from which 
individuals must act. This framework has been termed the level of 
ideological fantasy—“the level on which ideology structures the social 
reality itself.”15 Ideology, as Marx articulated it, is “Sie wissen das nicht, 
aber sie tun es,” which is translated: “they do not know it, but they are 
doing it.”16 Ideology defines and sustains a given set of social relations. 
Marx employed this formula to try to illustrate that the proletariat was 
laboring under a “false consciousness” in bourgeoisie nationalistic 
capitalism, a consciousness that must be thrown off to see reality itself—to 
understand the world as it “really is.”17 However, it has come to be 
 
 
 11. DOUGLASS NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 48 (1981) [hereinafter 
NORTH, STRUCTURE].
 
 12. Id. at 49. E.g., Adam is a Democrat; Democrats support a progressive income tax; and 
therefore, Adam will support a progressive income tax. 
 13. Id. E.g., Adam believes that progressive income taxes are good. This example also illustrates 
that the “proper” distribution of income is an important part of ideology. 
 
 14. Id. E.g., Adam worked hard to make earn enough money to be part of the top income tax 
bracket and the progressive income tax requires me to pay a higher share of my income in taxes 
together cause me to reconsider my identity as a tax-and-spend Democrat. 
 
 15. ŽIŽEK, IDEOLOGY supra note 10, at 28. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id.
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understood that this unmasking is a fallacy itself—ideology can never be 
“thrown off” because reality itself can never be directly apprehended, it 
cannot be reproduced without a level of ideological fantasy.
18
  
Because the concept of ideological fantasy is counterintuitive, a sample 
framing is necessary. First, even at the base level of raw perceptional 
awareness, “reality itself” is incomprehensible. From an anatomical design 
perspective, we are unable to directly apprehend and make sense of the 
boundless perceptual stimuli constantly bombarding our senses. Most of 
these stimuli are completely ignored, some are comprehended 
unconsiciously, and even less are consciously recognized. These parts that 
we are conscious of are formed together and experienced as if we live in a 
simple, seamless universe. Second, the same is true for constructed 
narratives of our existence. Our self-narratives are contradictory, 
incomplete, and, occasionally, paralyzingly puzzling upon introspection. 
What we do know about ourselves is dwarfed by what we do not. Our 
motivations, passions, and sparks for action emanate not from logical 
analysis but from a wellspring of unconscious factors that overwhelm our 
conscious capacities.
19
 They all interact to create our perceptions, shape 
our analysis, and cause both our unconscious and conscious actions. It is 
this underlying background of unknown knowns—the “unconscious” 
forces—that forms the level of ideological fantasy.20  
Social reality and the “world we live in” are built (at least partially) 
upon the complex interaction of billions of human beings all with their 
own unique living, breathing brains shaping the way they understand the 
world.
21
 Thus, understanding the way ideology works is essential to the 
understanding of how social, political, and economic institutions remain 
 
 
 18. Id. Thus, Marx’s utopian understanding of the relation of labor to capital is also a “false 
consciousness,” because its foundations rest on a level of ideological mystification—a level of 
normative values about the way the world is and should be.  
 19. Such factors should include: the language we think in and its grammatical constraints, our 
diet, sleep, and hormonal patterns, what is and is not available to be recalled from our memory, and a 
myriad of other elements. 
 20. THE REALITY OF THE VIRTUAL (Ben Wright Film Prods. 2004). In this lecture/documentary 
Žižek highlights the statement by Donald Rumsfled about epistemological categories—“[T]here are 
known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is 
to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns—there 
are things we do not know we don’t know.” He then turns to the fourth and unmentioned category—
the unknown knowns. The unknown knowns are the things we do not know that we know, the 
unconscious, and Žižek cautions that it is important to keep this category in mind when thinking about 
who we are and how we act. 
 21. This is just a starting point of course. I am certainly undervaluing the impact other animals 
and objects (animate and inanimate) have in structuring our daily existence. For one example, see the 
documentary OBJECTIFIED (Plexi Prods. 2009). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol5/iss2/4
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stable and viable through time. Institutions, in North’s terms, are the rules 
of the game—the basic framework within which human beings interact or 
the humanly designed constraints placed on choices.
22
 The institutional 
structure that governs our interactions can be described as the “social 
order.”23 It is the social order that mediates the relationships between the 
subject and other subjects.
24
 This social order informs our belief structure 
at the level of ideological fantasy because it limits access to beliefs about 
the way the world is and should be.
25
 Because of the complications 
introduced above and the natural complications inherent in the world 
itself,
26
 no belief system could ever be completely accurate in its depiction 
of the world around us.
27
  
A shared belief, or consensus ideology, in the legitimacy of the social 
order increases cooperation and lowers compliance costs because 
individuals are more likely to engage in first-person enforcement of the 
rules of the game.
28
 In a self-reinforcing style, institutions generate 
behaviors by structuring incentives in certain ways.
29
 These repeated 
behaviors give rise to beliefs about how the world works, which beliefs 
reinforce the institutions that generated them in the first place.
30
 The 
legitimacy of the institution fosters cooperation, and limits the 
opportunities and incentives for shirking or opportunism.
31
 However, as 
diverse ideologies evolve, different groups may view the institutional 
arrangement differently—as unfair and illegitimate because it works 
against their interests.
32
 In such a case, resources must be invested into 
convincing those holding divergent beliefs that the institutions are fair and 
legitimate so as to maintain cooperative norms.
33
 In addition, rules must be 
 
 
 22. NORTH, STRUCTURE, supra note 11, at 49.
 
 23. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, JOHN JOSEPH WALLIS & BARRY R. WEINGAST, VIOLENCE AND 
SOCIAL ORDERS 29 (2009) [hereinafter NORTH, VIOLENCE].
 
 24. See generally IDEOLOGY, supra note 10, at 28–36.
 
 25. NORTH, VIOLENCE, supra note 23, at 29.
 
 26. Of course here I am talking about the level at which the basic laws of physics, chemistry and 
biology constrain the possible ways of interacting and being.  
 27. NORTH, VIOLENCE, supra note 23, at 28. While I recognize that this statement is a strong 
claim that North has made, I do not plan to address directly the question of whether it is possible that 
someone could have an accurate, or even “correct,” depiction of the world as it “really is.”
 
 28. NORTH, STRUCTURE, supra note 11, at 53.
 
 29. NORTH, VIOLENCE, supra note 23, at 29. 
 30. Id.  
 31. NORTH, STRUCTURE, supra note 11, at 53–54.
 
 32. Id. at 56.
 
 33. Id. 
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formalized and compliance procedures developed with an eye towards the 
costs of detecting and punishing violations.
34
 
Thus, an ideological framework that holds the judiciary as a legitimate 
institution is essential for maintaining order with its own set of internal 
rules (formal and informal) governing its structure and operation. The 
judicial branch is responsible for determining the formal rules of society.
35
 
Maintaining a stable social order requires cooperation and a willingness to 
comply with the law.
36
 In a symbolic sense, the judge signifies the Law 
and, occasionally really does determine it.
37
 Therefore, the perceived 
legitimacies of the judge and the court are important signs that the Law 
itself is legitimate, which in turn fosters a willingness to comply with it. 
This behavioral pattern derived from the perceived legitimacy of the Law 
can be called a “rule of law norm.” Accordingly, any affront to this 
legitimacy may also lead to a decrease in the rule of law norm. 
A. Naïve Realism 
This concept of ideology—that ideology is an individual’s subjective 
perceptions about the way the world is and how it ought to be—is broader 
than the one commonly articulated by legal scholars. Bryan Lammon, in 
his article What We Talk About When We Talk About Ideology, lays out his 
reading of judicial politics scholarship’s use of the term ideological and its 
meaning.
38
 Lamon describes “judicial politics scholars” as political 
scientists who, by studying the courts, seek to uncover the determinants of 
judicial decisions empirically and have conceived of ideology in partisan, 
 
 
 34. Id.
 
 35. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177–78 (1803). “It is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to 
particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, 
the courts must decide on the operation of each. So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both 
the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case 
conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding 
the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very 
essence of judicial duty.”
 
 36. NORTH, STRUCTURE, supra note 11, at 53–54. 
 37. See John N. Drobak & Douglass C. North, Understanding Judicial Decision-Making: The 
Importance of Constraints on Non-Rational Deliberations, 26 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 131, 142 (2008) 
(“Occasionally, Judges really do decide cases and determine what the Law is, even though the greatest 
impact is the number of potential cases that were avoided because of the symbolic function of the Law 
and the regularity of its decisions allows for actors to incorporate the likely consequences should they 
go in front of a Judge. (i.e., in deterring a crime, in negotiating a settlement before filing a claim, 
etc. . . .)”).
 
 38. Lammon, supra note 2. 
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political terms.
39
 In developing the attitudinal model of judicial decision-
making, these scholars tend to explain ideology along a simplistic 
Democrat versus Republican political leanings model.
40
 Early scholarship 
portrayed judges as influenced by a number of different “extra legal” 
factors, but not necessarily as partisans.
41
 Later political scholarship 
abandons this pluralistic framework of judicial fallibility and focuses on 
the distinctly partisan nature of judicial decision-making.
42
 Overall, the 
legacy of this scholarship conflates the terms “political” and “ideological”; 
hence, the influence of the strict attitudinal model maintains “an image of 
the judiciary that is ambiguously political at best and pejoratively partisan 
at worst.”43  
This perception of judges as political actors has come under sharp 
rebuke in recent years from legal scholars on two fronts. First, the 
attitudinal model has been charged with not adequately taking into account 
legal doctrine and norms.
44
 This positivist approach emphasizes that the 
vast majority of decisions are reached by following legal precedent, but in 
some cases discretionary determinations are unavoidable or inherent parts 
of the law.
45
 If the political worldview of the judge dominates in these 
decisions when no clear legal rule exists, then so be it.
46
 Second, the 
attitudinal model fails to take into account the fact that judges are human, 
and therefore judges are subject to the same biases and flaws that all 
humans are susceptible of when making decisions.
47
 
This psychological approach provides a powerful theoretical model of 
decision-making that critiques the attitudinal model, while accounting for 
the empirical findings of judicial politics scholarship.
48
 Naïve Realism is 
the psychological theory that life is inherently subjective and that, in 
making decisions, each individual may be influenced by different 
 
 
 39. Id. at 233–37.
 
 40. Id. at 256–62.
 
 41. Id. at 255 (“Perhaps the findings of early judicial politics scholarship can best be summed up 
on the oft-repeated adage that judges are human.”).
 
 42. Id. at 256–62.
 
 43. Id. at 262.
 
 44. Kim, supra note 4, at 404 (“The simplest explanation for lower court compliance is that 
judges have legal preferences independent of their political preferences. More precisely, even if judges 
care about whether the outcome in a given case advances their preferred policy, they likely care about 
whether it conforms to legal norms as well.”).
 
 45. Id. at 385. 
 46. Id. 
 
 47. See Lammon, supra note 2; Chris Guthrie, Jeffery J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, 
Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007).
 
 48. Lammon, supra note 2, at 262.
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cognitive, perceptual, and motivational biases.
49
 Further, individuals will 
often believe their judgments are the most objective and rational ones out 
of a given choice set.
50
 In addition, individuals believe that those who 
disagree with them are most likely influenced by some cognitive or 
perceptual bias when they make an alternative decision.
51
 Thus, 
individuals attribute decisions made by others to cognitive biases, while 
simultaneously believing that when faced with similar decisions they are 
able to rise above their own cognitive biases and prejudices to make a 
truly rational decision.
52
 Essentially, individuals are blind to their own 
perceptual or cognitive biases, but not those of others.  
This theory has been supplemented with the introduction of motivated 
reasoning. Motivated reasoning is the “unconscious tendency of 
individuals to process information in a manner that suits some end or goal 
extrinsic to the formation of accurate beliefs.”53 One such goal extrinsic to 
the formation of accurate beliefs is identity protection.
54
 Individuals often 
define themselves by the groups of which they are members.
55
 When such 
a group is threatened with a proposition that critiques the group or a group 
belief, thus harming the individual by reducing the social standing or self-
esteem that person enjoys by virtue of the group’s reputation, individuals 
engage in identity-protective cognition.
56
 
Naïve realism, motivated reasoning, and identity protection provide a 
theoretical model for how decisions are made and the hazards 
accompanying such tasks; cultural cognition brings this theoretical model 
full circle. Cultural cognition is the theory that individuals tend
 
to conform 
their perceptions of risk and other policy-consequential facts to their 
cultural worldviews.
57
 “Cultural worldview” is a synonym for ideology; 
the theory posits that ideology plays a prominent place in our political 
lives.
58
 Individual and group differences influence beliefs about how the 
State should best attain the secular goods of safety, health, security, and 
 
 
 49. Id. at 271.
 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 272–80.
 
 52. Id. at 278–80.
 
 53. Kahan, supra note 1, at 19. 
 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id.  
 56. Id.  
 57. Id. at 23 (“Cultural cognition refers to the tendency of individuals to conform their 
perceptions of risk and other policy-consequential facts to their cultural worldviews. Cultural 
worldviews consist of systematic clusters of values relating to how society should be organized.”).
 
 58. Id. at 23–27. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol5/iss2/4
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prosperity.
59
 Differences in ideology trigger identity-protective cognition. 
Naïve reasoning is the standard response as parties go back and forth over 
“facts” surrounding and supporting their beliefs.60 This response typically 
manifests itself in the form of competing empirical, welfare-oriented 
arguments that tends to generate cycles of “recrimination and 
resentment.”61 
Naïve legal realism is the theoretical model applied to judicial 
decision-making. It is the most generous theory to date for describing the 
underlying psychological mechanisms that play out in judicial decisions 
and explaining the empirical findings of judicial politics scholarship. 
However, the implications of this theory jeopardize the Court’s legitimacy. 
At face value, it tends to describe this back and forth as an inevitable 
byproduct of differing worldviews and suggests that judges are unable to 
escape making decisions along ideologically-derived lines. As a truly 
liberal institution, the Court’s role is to be the enforcer of the State’s 
“obligations to count every citizen’s preference in the democratic-
lawmaking calculus but to refrain from imposing a collective vision of the 
best way to live.”62 Thus, the implication is that judges are unable to live 
up to their obligations because their decisions are inescapably premised on 
their vision of the best way to organize society. While naïve legal realism 
critiques and dispenses with challenges that a judge’s political and policy 
preferences determine his or her votes in individual cases, it does nothing 
to address the underlying charge that, occasionally, judicial decisions are 
made based on the judge’s political beliefs.  
The normative implications of this fact are not readily apparent at this 
level. Some scholars see this truth as unchangeable,
63
 while others do not 
view it as problematic,
64
 and still others see it as an essential feature of our 
constitutional process.
65
 Some theorists tend to believe that structural 
 
 
 59. Id.  
 60. Id. 
 
 61. Id. at 26. The “debate” over the effects of anthropogenic climate change offers a good 
example of how diametrically opposed interest groups can engage in such a back and forth over what 
would presumably be “objectively” determinable facts. When each side brings its own facts to the 
table, and refuses to acknowledge the legitimacy of an opponent’s facts, a cycle of recrimination and 
resentment is perpetuated. This example further illustrates the pitfalls of such a debate for the party 
proposing political changes: for over 40 years we have debated whether and how much CO2 emissions 
affect the climate with virtually no progress on addressing the potential problem that increased 
atmospheric CO2 may pose. 
 
 62. Id. at 4.
 
 63. See TAMANAHA, supra note 6, at 242 (“Nothing can be done about the subconscious springs 
of human intellect”).
 
 64. See generally Kim, supra note 4.
 
 65. See Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. 
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features of our national system of governance keep the court in check.
66
 
Yet other scholars have recognized that this distance between what judges 
say they do and what they actually do is troubling for our system of 
government.
67
 The responses from this group of scholars have not been to 
challenge the courts biases, nor have they articulated how and why 
neutrality should find root within the court. Instead, these scholars have 
proposed either structural changes in the way the court is organized in 
order to minimize dissensus,
68
 or rhetorical changes in the way the court 
communicates its decisions to minimize the impact of this political 
reasoning.
69
 Implicit in these arguments is the notion that the gaps between 
what judges say they do and what they really do must be obscured as best 
as possible.  
B. The Two Fronts in the Neutrality Crisis 
Non-neutral judicial decision-making, as I have described it, resonates 
on two fronts. First, among judicial scholars, non-neutral decision-making 
is mostly accepted and treated as a curiosity. Scholars seek to develop an 
accurate positive model for judicial decisions by employing empirical 
studies and cognitive theory to develop a model of judicial decision-
making that takes such non-neutral biases into account. The idea that 
judges made decisions solely based on reasoning from prior law—
reasoning described as “legalism” or “formalism”—is universally mocked. 
 
 
REV. 549, 563, 565 (2009) (“When courts exercise judicial review to strike down laws, they often 
work in cooperation with the dominant national political coalition” and “They are active participants in 
the national political coalition of their era.”).
 
 66. Id. at 566 (Noting that “institutional and structural elements in the political system tend to 
hem in judicial constructions” and pointing to professional legal culture, the symbolic relationship 
between courts and the political branches, and control over the appointment process as guarantees that 
judicial innovations are likely to occur only within certain boundaries); Tamanaha, supra note 6, at 
242 (2006) (Rule bound decision-making keeps justice in check); see generally Kim, supra note 4 
(Noting the discretion in the lower courts decentralizes authority and that power diffused within the 
layers of Court authority counteracts any select group of judges authority to enforce their policy 
preferences as Law).
 
 67. Kahan, supra note 1, at 6.
 
 68. Lammon, supra note 2, at 302 (2009) (proposing smaller circuits and fewer judges to 
encourage collegiality). Dissensus is defined as “widespread disagreement” in MERRIAN-WEBSTER, 
but ther term is much richer than that. I understood it to be the opposite of a consensus—a division in 
or opposition to the common understanding. In searching for a more appropriate definition, I came 
across Jacques Ranciere’s statement of dissensus as “a division inserted in ‘common sense’: a dispute 
over what is given and about the frame within which we sense something is given.” JACQUES 
RANCIERE, DISSENSUS: ON POLITICS AND AESTHETICS 69 (2010).  
 69. Kahan, supra note 1, at 6 (encouraging Judges to employ aporia and affirmation in writing 
legal opinions to minimize identity protective cognition).
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However, among the population at large—“We the People” to put it in 
Constitutional terms—judicial neutrality is still hailed as an essential 
feature of our constitutional republic. A non-neutral judiciary would have 
a profound impact upon the legitimacy of the institution should this 
understanding of judicial decision-making erode the convergent ideology 
of judicial neutrality. The impact would be found in the people’s behavior 
and beliefs. This undermines one of the most basic premises of liberal, 
Western democracy: the rule of law, not man. 
It appears that the distance between these two fronts is great. At the 
academic level, these problems seem as old as the Republic. Political 
parties truly evolved in opposition to the Federalists and the long history 
of bitter congressional infighting began in earnest over the Midnight 
Judges Act of 1800.
70
 Justices Marshall and Story dominated federal 
questions for almost the first fifty years of our republic, setting a decisive 
tone for the role the judiciary would play in filling out the scaffolds put in 
place by the Constitution. The New Deal justices dramatically expanded 
federal authority in the wake of the Great Depression. Since the 1930s, 
judicial scholars have known and charged that legal formalism is a lie, that 
the law is not whole, that occasionally judges must fill in the gaps, and 
that in these gaps the judge has the ability to influence the path of the 
law.
71
 Jurists have long expressed a view of judging that acknowledges the 
limitations of law and judges.
72
 This is to be expected from a nation that 
was born out of the Enlightenment, which sought to establish reason as the 
guiding force of society by turning a critical lens on historically sacred 
institutions. The Enlightenment ethos elevated the “rule of law” over man 
as the “rule of reason” and was essential in both the American and French 
Revolutions. However, the Enlightenment has failed in one critical 
respect: it has failed to formulate objective principles of law and society.
73
 
Thus, paradoxically, the critical eye of the Enlightenment undermined the 
“rule of law” as traditionally understood (evolving from natural law and 
long held customs) without offering any adequate replacements. While 
 
 
 70. See Judiciary Act of 1801, 2 Stat. 89. See generally LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN LAW. 
 71. See generally BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE (2009) 
(debunking this narrative, but ultimately endorsing a belief that jurists have always expressed a 
balanced realism about judging). 
 72. Id. 
 73. See TAMANAHA, supra note 6, at 22 (noting three reasons for this failure, multiple answers to 
life’s questions discovered in exploring the world, that human nature at its most common level is 
rather base, and that the power and scope of reason were restricted to finding means but not 
developing ends).
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
302 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 5:289 
 
 
 
 
utilitarian theory and secular liberalism seem to provide a goal for the 
modern state, there are sharp divides over the means of achieving such 
ends. 
Despite this intellectual quagmire, at the level of the common man, 
society seems to be progressing, blissfully unaware of the crumbling 
philosophical underpinnings of the law. As John Drobak writes in his 
forthcoming work COURTS, COOPERATION, AND LEGITIMACY, there are a 
number of factors that foster the perceived legitimacy of the courts.
74
 First, 
judges are traditionally viewed as non-political actors whose decisions are 
based on non-political reasons.
75
 Second, the court makes heavy use of 
symbolic representations of power
76
 and performs rituals that instill a 
reverence for the court.
77
 Third, the court often practices self-restraint and 
refrains from stepping beyond its authority.
78
 Fourth, the court is 
respectful of the other branches of government.
79
 Lastly, the court has a 
long history of producing quality decisions and opinions.
80
 These 
behaviors lend a tremendous deal of support for the court. 
This support has shown up consistently in gallup polls, which show a 
high percentage of Americans approve the way the Supreme Court handles 
its job.
81
 Over the past sixteen years between 65–80% of people 
consistently have said that they trust the judicial branch headed by the 
Supreme Court.
82
 These beliefs are held even though 75% of people 
believe that “Supreme Court Justices usually decide their 
case . . . sometimes let[ting] their own ideological views influence their 
decisions.”83 When asked if “Supreme Court justices usually decide their 
cases based on legal analysis without regard to partisan politics, or . . . 
 
 
 74. See JOHN N. DROBAK, COURTS, COOPERATION, AND LEGITIMACY (Sept. 26, 2011) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
 
 75. Id.
 
 76. Id. For example, judges wear black robes, the judge sits at a higher bench than everyone else 
in the room, court houses often are very phallic in appearance, etc.
 
 77. Id. For example, all persons rise before the judge enters the room, parties and attorneys refer 
to the judge as “your honor,” etc.
 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id.
 
 80. Id. 
 81. Supreme Court, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/4732/supreme-court.aspx (last visited 
May 13, 2013). The Supreme Court has held an approval rating between 42 and 62% over the past 12 
years.
 
 82. Id. Between 65% (Sept. 13–15, 2004) and 80% (Feb. 4–8, 1999) of Americans have a great 
deal or fair amount of confidence in the judicial branch headed by the U.S. Supreme Court. This is also 
consistent with older surveys from the 1970s where confidence was between 63% (June 1976) and 
71% (Apr. 1974).
 
 83. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION HEALTH TRACKING POLL, from Jan. 12–17, 2012, available at 
http://www.pollingreport.com/court.htm (last visited May 13, 2013). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol5/iss2/4
  
 
 
 
 
2013] CYNICAL REALISM AND JUDICIAL FANTASY 303 
 
 
 
 
they sometimes let their own partisan political views influence their 
decisions,” 19% said “usually legal analysis” while 78% said “sometimes 
political views” with only 4% saying they were unsure.84 While it appears 
as though there are no data on people’s perceptions as to whether we 
should be governed by the “rule of law” or not, given its fundamental 
place in our design, it is dogma that there is at least nominal support for 
this idea.  
These data present us with a paradox. While the people have 
consistently supported the Court, they also view the Justices as partisan 
political actors. There are two ways to interpret these data. On the one 
hand, the people think along the same lines as Justice Breyer, who stated: 
“By the time you have 40 or 50 years in any profession, you begin to 
formulate very, very general views. . . . What is America about? What are 
the people of America about? How in this country does law relate to the 
average human being? How should it? And it’s a good thing, not a bad 
thing that people’s outlook on that court is not always the same.”85 On the 
other hand, the people may think partisan decision-making is acceptable 
because at least some of the Justices maintain the same partisan beliefs as 
their supporters. Consequently, they are considered to be protecting the 
vital interests of that particular group. 
This second way of interpreting the data presents some very serious 
problems to minorities whose beliefs are not represented in the courts 
system. If no one on the Court embodies the political values of the 
minority, then the Court’s judicial power is built solely upon the raw 
power embodied in its judicial decree—a decree with the power to lock 
individuals away, take away a child, take property from one and give it to 
another, or demand any other remedy available to the Court. This power is 
backed up by the executive’s ability to send heavily armed men anywhere 
in their sovereign domain to enforce those directives. If that power is used 
to systematically discriminate against a minority’s interest, then the list of 
options for protecting that group’s interest becomes increasingly short.86 
 
 
 84. AP National Constitutional Center Poll, from Aug. 11–16, 2010, available at http://www 
.pollingreport.com/court.htm (last visited May 13, 2013). 
 85. Emmarie Huetteman, Breyer and Scalia Testify at Senate Judiciary Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 6, 2011, at A21, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/06/us/politics/breyer-and-scalia-
testify-at-senate-hearing.html (last visited May 13, 2013).
 
 86. For example, say you are a polygamist and believe that group marriage is a legitimate form 
of relationship that deserves equal protection under the law. The state you are in has an anti-polygamy 
law that violates your perceived “rights”—be they individual, associational, or religious—to marry 
more than one person and have that marriage recognized by the state. Any judge that hears your case is 
most likely going to be biased against your position, as there is no partisan distinction on sympathy 
towards polygamy as the political parties are currently constituted. How you react to this fact will 
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The insights provided by North’s Structure and Change in Economic 
History intimate that this unrepresented minority will only obey the rules 
if the calculus of getting caught and paying the price outweighs the 
expected return of breaking them.
87
 Given the levels of enforcement vis-à-
vis opportunities for acting contrary to the rules, this choice will occur 
rarely. Naïve realism seems to call into question the ability to judge 
impartially and indicates that judges may be biased along political lines. 
Thus, the more people who fit into that unrepresented minority category 
and believe its voice is not being represented by the Justices, the less 
likely the judiciary is to be viewed as a legitimate institution. In the face of 
this critical theory, both legal academics and the informed polity may all 
engage in maintaining the ideological façade, because all are able to 
comprehend the catastrophic consequences of revealing the lie as such.  
III. CYNICISM 
If you’re sick and tired of the politics of cynicism and polls and 
principles, come and join this campaign. 
—George W. Bush 
In the end, that’s what this election is about.  
Do we participate in a politics of cynicism or a politics of hope? 
—Barack Obama 
In the late 1930s and into the 1940s, legal realism fell into disrepute 
after witnessing the rise of Nazism and Communism.
88
 The ascendant 
paradigm for understanding judicial decision-making only a decade before 
was rejected in the face of the legal regimes being erected in Germany and 
the new Soviet state. Judicial actors engaged in identity protective 
cognition and motivated reasoning to reject any implication that American 
law was anything like Nazi law.
89
 However, legal realism was not, itself, a 
 
 
probably be determined by how you view the legitimacy of the institution—if you believe in the 
judiciary’s legitimacy, you may feel wronged but that at least your grievance was heard and that you 
can continue your campaign as a legal matter by looking for alternative legal theories that will better 
represent the legal reasoning behind your petition. However, if you view the court’s reign as 
illegitimate and hostile to your interests at their core, then why would you not grab a bunch of guns, 
set up a quasi-autonomous collective on the edges of society, and fire upon any state agent that gets 
close?  
 87. NORTH, STRUCTURE supra note 11, at 53. 
 88. TAMANAHA, supra note 6, at 73–74 (“Legal Realism was effectively silenced”).
 
 89. Id. at 73.
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pioneering exercise. Rather, legal realism was simply a comment on the 
underpinnings of the law drawn from various other fields, including the 
natural sciences and Marxism, and furthermore, was not unique to the 
law.
90
 Today, the ideas that underpinned this movement have cut so deep 
that even our unconscious, ideological processes are turning the law from 
a coherent whole into the manipulated instrument of legislators in robes. 
We are becoming more and more cynical. 
A clear definition of cynicism is necessary before delving into more 
detail. Cynicism is a philosophy of “saying the truth” with “strategy and 
tactics, suspicion and disinhibition, pragmatics and instrumentalism—all 
in the hands of a political ego that [t]hinks first and foremost about itself, 
an ego that is inwardly adroit and outwardly armored.”91 Cynicism is a 
two-step process, and it can occur unconsciously. First, one must “say the 
truth.” In order to do so, they must either reveal a big secret or point to 
some previous unknown (or all too well known) thing and declare it to be 
true (or false). In this case, the big truth is that the ideal of judicial 
neutrality is a lie because it is undermined by the judge’s ideological 
biases. Second, the response must be designed to meet the critical-
ideological attack by recognizing and taking into account the particular 
interest group behind the ideological universality and then find reasons to 
retain the mask.
92
 In this case, the interests protected are, purportedly, the 
common good that stems from having the judicial branch appear to be 
both a neutral arbiter and a check on the use of coercive state power.  
The key to this dilemma is perception. An analogy, suggested by 
Benforado and Hanson, may be helpful here. In sports broadcasting there 
are two different sets of commentary: on the one hand there is the play-by-
play description of players’ movements and the outcomes of their actions, 
and on the other there is the colored commentary focusing on the 
strengths, weaknesses, tendencies, and background of the teams.
93
 Judicial 
scholars from law schools, political science departments, and the bench are 
all currently engaged in the play-by-play descriptions of judicial decision-
making by describing how it happens and discussing how it should be 
played. In doing so, they bring out policy and economic arguments to 
assert that a certain way of playing is more beneficial than others. The 
media commentator class provides the colored commentary on the way 
 
 
 90. Id. at 74–75.
 
 91. PETER SLOTERDIJK, CRITIQUE OF CYNICAL REASON xxix (1988).
 
 92. ŽIŽEK, IDEOLOGY, supra note 10, at 29.
 
 93. Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, Naïve Cynicism: Maintaining False Perceptions in Policy 
Debates, 57 EMORY L.J. 499, 505 (2008). 
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decisions are made and shapes public opinion on how to interpret as well 
as understand the background to judicial decision-making. 
In the world of “informed academics,” the “play-by-play description” 
has become increasingly cynical. Critical Legal Studies turned against the 
law to expose its inner contradictions and how the law protects some 
interests over others. The latest positive models—embodied by naïve legal 
realism—assert that at least some portion of judicial decisions is 
determined by the judge’s unconscious ideological biases. In confronting 
this question, they raise the question of what to do about it in a 
straightforward manner. Reponses to this question focus on limiting the 
neutrality crisis’ scope by reinforcing the notion that this unconscious bias 
only affects a small portion of cases where the law does not provide a 
clearly determined outcome. It then proposes solutions that would mitigate 
the neutrality crisis’ impact on the polity. For example, Lammon points 
out that there is not widespread dissensus among courts of appeals because 
it is “likely that in many cases judges’ common experiences lead them to 
subjectively perceive a case in the same way, or at least similarly enough 
that there is no significant disagreement in the proper outcome.”94 Failing 
that, institutional factors like “collegiality” allow for “open and amicable 
discussion of real values and views,” which can overcome the problems 
posed by naïve realism.
95
 Simultaneously, Lammon suggests institutional 
changes that would foster collegiality to further reduce the instance of 
dissensus or politically derived judicial decisions in an attempt to make the 
game fairer.
96
 Kahan argues that when judges must articulate decisions 
with an “inherent risk that citizens will perceive decisions that threaten 
their group commitments to be a product of judicial bias,”97 then the 
judges should engage in the expressive virtues of “aporia”98 and 
“affirmation.”99 These strategies change the way the judge communicates 
decisions in order to reduce instances of identity protective cognition and 
cynical rebuke from dissenting judges.
100
 While these mitigation responses 
 
 
 94. See Lammon, supra note 2, at 297.
 
 95. Id. at 297-300.
 
 96. Id. at 298. 
 97. Kahan, supra note 1, at 28.
 
 98. Id. at 62. Aporia refers to a particular mode of philosophical or argumentative engagement 
with the distinctive feature of acknowledging complexity. Id. 
 
 99. Id. at 67. Affirmation refers to a rhetorical device for mitigating identity-protective cognition 
by conveying information by means that are likely to affirm rather than to threaten individuals’ group 
commitments. Id.
 
 100. Id. at 60–72.
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are no doubt useful, they present clear evidence that the legal academy’s 
response to this neutrality crisis has been cynical. 
In the world of “everyday people,” the colored commentary has turned 
cynical as well. People overwhelmingly believe that a Supreme Court 
justice’s ideological or partisan political views influence their decisions.101 
Newspaper stories increasingly carry either “democratic appointee” or 
“republican appointee” when naming a federal judge.102 Critiques of 
certain decisions are becoming more hyperbolic in their characterization of 
judges in those opinions as unelected ideologues.
103
 This tone is adding 
fuel to the fire and shaping the way “everyday people” approach what a 
judge is, and what a judge should be.  
A. Legal Instrumentalism 
Legal instrumentalism is the idea that the law is a means to advance 
some interest.
104
 At its ideal, such instrumentalism is used to advance the 
common good alone.
105
 This is important for protecting the rule of law 
norms in the polity. As Brian Tamanaha points out, “what entitles the law 
to obedience, at least in the eyes of the citizenry, is the claim that it 
furthers the public good.”106 As Kahan explains, 
The most fundamental form of individual freedom that liberal 
constitutionalism secures for its citizens depends on the promise 
that government won’t impose legal obligations that presuppose 
adherence to a moral or political orthodoxy. It is only because 
citizens are assured that their laws are confined to pursuit of secular 
goods—ones open to enjoyment by persons of all cultural and moral 
outlooks—that they can view their assent to legal duties as 
 
 
 101. See supra notes 83–84. This cynicism is represented by the 75% and 78% numbers. 
 102. Adam Liptak, ‘Politicians in Robes’? Not Exactly, But . . ., N.Y. TIMES, Nov 27, 2012, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/27/us/judges-rulings-follow-partisan-lines.html.  
 103. Jeffrey Toobin, A Judicial Atrocity, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 29, 2013, http://www.newyorker 
.com/online/blogs/comment/2013/01/the-awful-recess-appointment-ruling-in-canning-v-national-labor-rel 
ations-board.html (last visited May 13, 2013). 
 104. See TAMANAHA, supra note 6, at 1.
 
 105. Id. at 215. This understanding that the Law should be used for the sake of what is common to 
the whole of society goes all the way back to Plato’s Laws and has been explicitly repeated through 
history, including in Locke’s famous Second Treatise. In fact, that the King “has refused his Assent to 
Laws, the most wholesome and necessary for the public good” was the first of the enumerated 
grievances our nation’s founders listed in the Declaration of Independence. Id. 
 
 106. Id. at 221.
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consistent with their freedom to pursue happiness on terms of their 
individual choosing.
107
 
However, the “common good” differs for each individual depending on 
varying ideology—what is in the “common good” is determined by an 
individual’s perception of what the world is like and what it should be.108 
Moral pluralism, skepticism, and “incommensurable paradigms” about 
what is in the “common good” pervade modern society.109 Naïve realism 
and motivated cognition fuel an identity protective cognition that 
galvanizes group solidarity in promoting their version of the common 
good over the opponent’s adaption.110  
The cynical response to this is to find ways to minimize the symptom 
without addressing the cause. Scholars are well aware that, next to 
corruption and bias, nothing can undermine the legitimacy of courts more 
than a perception that courts are acting politically.
111
 Thus, the institutional 
legitimacy of the judiciary seems to depend upon maintaining the cynical 
distance between the ideological front (judicial neutrality or formalism) 
and the “reality” (naïve realism). What else explains the near obsession 
with making judges say they are formalists when being confirmed to the 
high court? For instance, Justice Thomas, said that as a judge, “you want 
to be stripped down like a runner,” and “shed the baggage of ideology.” 
Justice Roberts provided another analogy when he stated: “I will 
remember that it’s my job to call balls and strikes and not to pitch or bat.” 
Most blatantly Sonia Sotomayor declared: “I don’t judge on the basis of 
ideology.” The record indicates that the assertion that one will strengthen 
the rule of law by ruling in an impartial manner is an essential prerequisite 
to becoming a Justice of the Supreme Court. However, to do so with 
empirical knowledge that this sort of decision-making is “impossible” 
requires cynical reasoning.
112
 
This is the paradox of an enlightened false consciousness—cynics are 
very aware of the political motivations underlying the ideological 
universality of the “formalist” judge. Still, they do not renounce it, as they 
continue claiming that the job of a judge is to make determinations free 
 
 
 107. Kahan, supra note 1, at 6.
 
 108. The recognition of this historically true fact in the past century has furthered the dissent of 
the old lie of Christian moral unity or that science can supply universal ideals of law and morality. 
 
 109. See TAMANAHA, supra note 6, at 223.
 
 110. See generally Kahan, supra note 1.
 
 111. DROBAK, COURTS, COOPERATION, AND LEGITIMACY, supra note 74.
 
 112. I assume that Supreme Court nominees are aware of the modern theories about judicial 
decision-making. Only if they were completely unaware would my charge that they are acting 
cynically be misdirected.  
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from political motivations. This distance between what is “known” and 
what is “said” is evidence of judicial cynicism; “[t]he cynical subject is 
quite aware of the distance between the ideological mask and the social 
reality, but he none the less still insists upon the mask.”113 The formula, 
therefore, for the cynic is: “they know very well what they are doing, but 
still, they are doing it.”114 This distance, however, does not sustain itself 
indefinitely, and requires new infusions of energy to be maintained.  
B. The Cynical Response to Naïve Realism 
The implicit advice given by Lammon and Kahan is that, by making 
structural and rhetorical changes, the judge can forestall the perception 
that she is acting in a non-neutral manner and, thus, continue to create this 
distance. To return to the analogy of play-by-play versus colored 
commentary, these suggestions are made to blunt any colored commentary 
that asserts judicial decisions are made politically by advocating changes 
to the way the actors stage the game. 
Lammon, picking up on a suggestion from Judge Harry Edwards, 
suggests increasing collegiality in the courts to facilitate an “open and 
amicable discussion of real values and views” to overcome the problems 
posed by naïve realism.
115
 This discussion would undoubtedly lead to less 
politically divisive court rulings and opinion because judges would be 
forced to confront and defend their biases, resulting in the emergence of a 
synthesized vision of the common good, which would be useful in 
perpetuating the current judicial order by reducing divisiveness. However, 
it does not address the reviled fact that a judge’s unconscious beliefs about 
the “common good” seep into the law. First, even if two “partisan” judges 
can agree as to what the common good embodies in a single decision, it is 
likely that it is shaped by other biases left unacknowledged, be they racial, 
social, class, gender, regional, sexual, or other. Second, this approach still 
facilitates biased decision-making because the judges’ ideological 
framework is left uninhibited; in fact, this approach encourages 
ideologically charged debate. It suggests that judges must actively 
promote and shop their values to other judges or else they will be lost in 
the subsequent negotiation over what the court’s policy preference will be 
 
 
 113. ŽIŽEK, IDEOLOGY, supra note 10, at 29. 
 114. See ŽIŽEK, IDEOLOGY, supra note 10, at 29 (citing Peter Sloterdijk, CRITIQUE OF CYNICAL 
REASON, supra note 91). 
 115. See Lammon, supra note 2, at 298–99 (citing Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision 
Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1998) and Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of 
Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1641 (2003)). 
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in the case before it. Instead of refocusing the debate on how to keep 
judges rule-bound and restrict the importance of ideology in decision-
making, colegiality encourages them to defend their beliefs.
116
  
Similarly, Kahan recommends that judges engage in certain rhetorical 
practices in opinion writing in order to minimize identity protective 
cognition and vicious rebukes from dissenting Justices.
117
 Still, Kahan fails 
to address the underlying fact that judges are engaging in political 
rulemaking. Instead, he addresses the fact that 
ordinary individuals cannot know, or be reasonably expected to 
know, whether the myriad laws that govern their lives [are not 
neutral]; they must depend on readily available and credible signs to 
be confident that the promise of liberal constitutionalism is being 
kept. All citizens in a democracy live with the risk that the law will 
at some point take a position that profoundly disappoints them. In a 
political culture devoid of the cues that would enable them to find 
evidence of the law’s neutrality in that circumstance, citizens 
necessarily lack the resources required to reconcile their moral 
autonomy with their duty to obey the law.
118
 
To provide cues of the law’s neutrality, he encourages judges to engage in 
“aporia” and “affirmation.”119 By “aporia” he means employing a literary 
or rhetorical style that acknowledges the complexity of legal issues and 
eschews expressions of certitude, particularly empirically-based 
certitude.
120
 This reservation is because “studies of motivated cognition 
and related dynamics show that pronouncements of certitude deepen 
 
 
 116. Id. at 301–03. Further, notes from game theory would suggest that a member of the court 
whose ideological loyalties are slightly askew from the other members of the court could use his or her 
distinct position to extract tremendous concessions from an ideological bloc to win a vote if it proves 
to be decisive. Collegiality would only matter within the ideological bloc and the minority outsider 
whose vote is necessary to gain a majority. There would be no need to integrate and work with 
members of an opposing coalition.
 
 117. See Kahan, supra note 1. Kahan focuses on Brown v. Plata and on Justice Scalia’s vicious 
dissent, which decried the majority, stating: “[T]he idea that the three District Judges in this case relied 
solely on the credibility of the testifying expert witnesses is fanciful. Of course they were relying 
largely on their own beliefs about penology and recidivism. And of course different district judges, of 
different policy views, would have ‘found’ that rehabilitation would not work and that releasing 
prisoners would increase the crime rate. I am not saying that the District Judges rendered their factual 
findings in bad faith. I am saying that it is impossible for judges to make ‘factual findings’ without 
inserting their own policy judgments, when the factual findings are policy judgments.” 131 S. Ct. 1910 
(2011) (emphasis in original). 
 118. Kahan, supra note 1, at 6.
 
 119. Id. at 60–72.
 
 120. Id. at 60. 
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group-based conflict.”121 Engaging in such activity would mean that 
“cultural intermediaries in the media, in government, and elsewhere might 
be less able to frame a particular case as culturally consequential. . . .”122 
Thus, the Justices are allowed to retain their anonymity, which protects the 
institutions’ legitimacy.123 In addition, he recommends that the Court 
engage in “affirmation” of groups that might otherwise be motivated by 
identity protective cognition to doubt the Court’s neutrality by “lining 
their opinions with a surplus of meanings.”124 This surplus would place a 
“shield between the Court and the dueling cultural constituencies that were 
most likely to question its neutrality.”125 
These responses suggest judges should adjust their opinions not to 
address the underlying issues of the judge’s instrumental use of the law, 
but instead to placate a fidgety polity. Employing these mechanisms would 
address the crisis generated by a people skeptical of the Court’s neutrality. 
In this way, it would minimize the Court’s impact on national discourse, 
thus protecting its perceived legitimacy and neutrality. This solution 
would prop up the cynical distance between the way things “really are” 
and the image necessary to maintain the social order. 
This puts cynical reasoning at the heart of the debate over how judges 
should respond to the insights provided by the naïve realist theoretical 
model. Naïve realism’s insights are not limited to those who consciously 
set out to influence the law in this way. Therefore, in order to assert the 
truth of statements such as, “I do not permit my sympathies, personal 
views, or prejudices to influence the outcome of my cases,”126 cynical 
reasoning is required. One’s beliefs about how best to order society affect 
the way one interprets facts, events, risks, and the law. Consequently, such 
statements cannot be “objectively true” because the individual’s 
ideological background influences opinions at the basic level of 
ideological fantasy by structuring the judges’ perceptions about the way 
the world is and should be. It is universally acknowledged that Justice 
Scalia reasons and votes as a Conservative judge, while Justice Breyer 
 
 
 121. Id. at 60–61 (citing Robert J. Robinson, Dacher Keltner, Andrew Ward & Lee Ross, Actual 
Versus Assumed Differences in Construal: “Naive Realism” in Intergroup Perception and Conflict, 68 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 414 (1995)).
 
 122. Id. at 63. 
 123. Id.
 
 124. Id. at 69.
 
 125. Id. at 70. Kahan points to Justice Scalia’s opinion in Columbia v. Heller, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) 
as a prototype for this sort of decision. Justice Scalia explained not only the country’s rich history of 
guns but also the country’s rich history of gun regulation.
 
 126. Confirmation Hearing of Justice Sotomayor, available at http://epic.org/privacy/sotomayor/ 
sotomoyor_transcript.pdf (last accessed May 13, 2012).
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does the same as a Liberal. Yet, both justices would claim that they apply 
the law as best they can to the case at hand. According to naïve realism, 
they are both correct. However, their individual perceptions about a 
particular case and the law are very different.  
The recent case of Crawford v. Marion County Election Board
127
 is a 
helpful illustration. Indiana’s election law, referred to as either the “Voter 
ID Law” or “SEA 483,” requires citizens voting in person on election day 
to present photo identification issued by the government.
128
 The 
requirement does not apply to absentee ballots submitted by mail, and the 
statute contains various exceptions for individuals living in nursing homes, 
indigents, and those voters with a religious objection to having their 
pictures taken.
129
 The Indiana Democratic Party and various other entities 
and individuals affiliated with the Democratic party filed a complaint 
seeking to enjoin enforcement of the act as it places a burden on the right 
to vote by individuals that, historically, tended to support Democratic 
candidates (mostly African Americans who are less likely to already have 
IDs).  
The District Court Judge Sarah Evans Baker granted defendants motion 
for summary judgment finding that the plaintiffs 
[h]ave not introduced evidence of a single, individual Indiana 
resident who will be unable to vote as a result of SEA 483 or who 
will have his or her right to vote unduly burdened by its 
requirements. Plaintiffs also have repeatedly advanced novel, 
sweeping political arguments which, if adopted, would require the 
invalidation, not only of SEA 483, but of other significant portions 
of Indiana’s election code which have previously passed 
constitutional muster and/or to which Plaintiffs do not actually 
object; indeed, they offer them as preferable alternatives to the new 
Voter ID Law. In so doing, Plaintiffs’ case is based on the implied 
assumption that the Court should give these Constitutional and 
statutory provisions an expansive review based on little more than 
their own personal and political preferences.
130
 
A divided Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
131
 Acknowledging 
that the law would disenfranchise at least some voters and that those 
 
 
 127. 553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
 128. Id. at 185. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 783 (S.D. Ind. 2006). 
 131. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007) 
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voters would most likely be Democratic voters, the court nevertheless 
ruled that “the inability of the sponsors of this litigation to find any such 
person to join as a plaintiff suggests that the motivation for the suit is 
simply that the law may require the Democratic Party and the other 
organizational plaintiffs to work harder to get every last one of their 
supporters to the polls.”132 The fact that there was not a disenfranchised 
voter among the class of plaintiffs seems to have been determinative for 
the court. Yet, this holding is a strange and novel way of disposing the 
case, considering that there was in fact standing to challenge the 
application of the statute. Furthermore, as the new law had not actually 
been employed yet, an “as applied” challenge would presumably be 
unripe. The dissent viciously retorted: “Let’s not beat around the bush: 
The Indiana voter photo ID law is a not-too-thinly-veiled attempt to 
discourage election-day turnout by certain folks believed to skew 
Democratic.”133 
As is readily apparent from a full reading of both opinions, the political 
nature of this question and the decidedly political impacts of the court’s 
ruling dominated both the majority’s and the dissent’s opinions of how 
this case should be decided. Because the District Court and majority in the 
Seventh Circuit found the Democrats’ challenge to be a thinly veiled 
attempt to force the court to impose its own “personal and political 
preferences” over the will of the Indiana legislature, the court applied a 
lower form of constitutional scrutiny and upheld the law. The dissent 
believed that the burdens fell on the right to vote—a fundamental right—
and, therefore, would have applied “strict scrutiny light,” a level of 
constitutional scrutiny used precisely for these sorts of political cases, in 
striking it down.
134
  
The key points in the lower court’s decision can be found by pulling 
out the objective criteria indicating political bias. The District Court 
judge—Judge Sarah Evans Baker—was a Ronald Reagan appointee, 
former legislative counsel for Representative Gilbert Gude (R-MD) and 
Senator Harting Percy (R-IL). The Seventh Circuit majority was written 
by Judge Posner, a Reagan appointee, eminently respectable Right-wing 
intellectual, and supporter of the Republican Party and its politics,
135
 and 
 
 
 132. Id. at 951–52 (citing exit polls acknowledging that 67% of voters with incomes below 
$15,000 vote Democrat and they are the ones most unable to get to the polls). 
 133. Id. at 954. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See Nina Totenberg, Federal Judge Richard Posner: The GOP Has Made Me Less 
Conservative, NPR, (July 5, 2012) http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2012/07/05/156319272/ 
federal-judge-richard-posner-the-gop-has-made-me-less-conservative. In the article, Judge Posner 
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Judge Diane Sykes, a George W. Bush appointee and purportedly a 
member of the Federalist Society. The Seventh Circuit dissent was written 
by Judge Terrance T. Evans, who was appointed to the district court by 
Jimmy Carter and later appointed to the Seventh Circuit by Bill Clinton. 
Thus the law was upheld along strictly partisan lines—even if that partisan 
line was towed because of unconscious beliefs, its effects are apparent in 
the lead up to the Supreme Court taking the case. Despite the fact that the 
impacts of the law may have been considered disproportionately 
discriminatory, the Conservative judges examined the case through the 
lens of ideology. In doing so they implicitly concluded that there was an 
attempt by the Democrat Party to overturn a legitimate law whose 
requirements fell broadly and evenly on all aspects of society. In 
dissenting, the Liberal judge felt that the impact restricted the right to vote 
and, thus, required closer scrutiny. 
At the Supreme Court, the ideological divide also proved conclusive, 
but with a slight twist of interest to our analysis. The law was upheld in a 
three-three-three split, with Justice Stevens writing the lead opinion 
(joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy) and Justice Scalia 
writing a concurrence (joined by Justice Thomas and Justice Alito).
136
 The 
Stevens opinion upheld the law against the attack by the Democratic Party 
because it was a broad facial attack and unsupported by evidence to say 
that there was an “excessively burdensome requirement,” although the 
Stevens opinion left the door open for a more targeted as-applied attack 
with a narrower remedy.
137
  
Justice Scalia’s concurrence was much more favorable to the defendant 
State of Indiana and can be read as a blanket invitation for states to impose 
even stricter voter identification laws. So long as the law’s burdens are 
“ordinary and widespread,” and states have an important regulatory 
interest like preventing voter fraud, the law will be upheld.
138
 This 
outcome includes those situations “even when their burdens purportedly 
fall disproportionately on a protected class.”139 Thus, while Justice 
Stevens’ opinion holds out the possibility of an as-applied challenge, 
 
 
acknowledges that he, and the conservative members of the Supreme Court, are openly aligned with 
the Right-wing political party (the Republicans) but that the “right-wingers” made a serious political 
mistake in criticizing Chief Justice Roberts’ decision in National Federation of Independent Business 
v. Sebelius (567 U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012)) and that this was making Chief Justice Roberts re-
think his ties to the party and the conservative ideology.  
 136. Crawford, 553 U.S. 181. 
 137. Id. at 202. 
 138. Id. at 206.  
 139. Id. at 207 (emphasis omitted).  
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Justice Scalia forecloses such a challenge when the burdens are not severe. 
This more extreme position tracks the perceived ideological loyalties of 
the justices adhering to it. 
Similarly, on the other side of the debate, the more Liberal justices of 
the Court—Justice Souter, Justice Ginsberg, and Justice Breyer—all 
believed the law should have been struck down as the state interests failed 
to justify the practical limitations placed on the right to vote, and the law 
imposed an unreasonable and irrelevant burden on voters who are poor 
and old.
140
 Justice Souter and Justice Ginsberg focused on the lack of 
evidence to suggest that in-person voter fraud was even a problem for the 
State of Indiana.
141
 Justice Breyer was concerned that a voter ID law, as 
restrictive as the Indiana law is, in effect, was the equivalent of a poll tax. 
In his view, even if the State makes free photo ID available, there is still a 
cost in obtaining transportation or the underlying document required to 
procure the ID (e.g., a birth certificate).
142
  
The partisan ideological breakdown from the lower court all the way to 
the Supreme Court on this highly controversial issue of an obvious 
partisan character fuels the neutrality crisis. The lead opinion in this 
case—formed from a coalition of a Liberal (Justice Stevens has 
historically been viewed as a Liberal on the Court), a Conservative (Chief 
Justice Roberts) and a Libertarian (Justice Kennedy)—can be read as an 
attempt to strike a pragmatic compromise. It puts off the hard question of 
whether the law is severely discriminatory as applied to some individuals, 
while upholding the law on its face. However, such a pragmatic 
compromise could not appeal to a majority of the Court. The majority of 
the justices—split down the middle between the Conservative concurrence 
and the Liberal dissent—decided to apply the law “as they see it,” which 
happened to correspond to their political beliefs. Motivated cognition, 
implicit bias, and identity protection undoubtedly played a part in the way 
these opinions were written.  
However, on its face, each opinion is written as if the law is the 
determinate factor. It helps that election law is relatively anomalous. The 
cynical approach to constitutional scrutiny tends to be that the “level” of 
scrutiny corresponds to the desired outcome. If a justice wants to uphold 
the law, then “rational basis scrutiny” is appropriate. This was the scrutiny 
 
 
 140. Id. at 237, 239. Justice Breyer goes even further than Justice Souter and finds that the 
burdens imposed in this case are severe and cannot be implemented unless narrowly tailored to a 
compelling state interest.  
 141. Id. at 236 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 142. Id. at 239 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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employed by Justice Scalia. On the other hand, if a justice wants to strike 
down the law, then “strict scrutiny” or something close to it is appropriate, 
as Justice Souter and Justice Breyer applied. The test applied by Justice 
Stevens in the lead opinion—the amorphous balancing standard 
announced in Anderson v. Celebrezze
143—is a prime example of how the 
Court will establish a legal doctrine that is impossible to apply in a 
systematic way when facing a tough case. Such an approach leaves room 
for the Court to enact its policy preference as law. By relying on the law as 
a cover for the partisan ideological preferences of each justice, the Court 
uses cynical reasoning to protect its opinions from charges of overt 
political bias. Without doubt, Conservative political commentators were 
able to defend the Court’s opinion as a legitimate application of 
established legal precedent, and Liberals were able to attack it.
144
  
C. So What? Why Bias Matters 
In confronting cynical reasoning as it applies to judicial decision-
making, it is clear that this Note is beset with normative charges subtly 
alleging that such cynical reasoning will likely result in negative societal 
consequences. But such a conclusion does not necessarily follow. The 
insight of the legal realists was that the “law must be viewed as it actually 
works and functions, not as an abstract body of rules, concepts and 
principles.”145 By framing the issue in such a way, it is easier to see that 
judges throughout history have been influenced by their particular 
backgrounds and have shaped and written the law—while calling it 
“interpretation”—in ways that comport with their ideology. Thus, the law 
changes with society. As new judges take the bench with different 
ideologies, they shape the law. In this way, the common law is not so 
much a coherent whole as it is whatever the new generation of judges 
wants it to be. Normative rules about the limits of judicial discretion do a 
lot to hem in departures from established precedent, so things do not get 
too out of hand.
146
 So what is the big deal? The only thing of absolute 
importance is to minimize popular distrust of the court so that it (and the 
ruling coalitions it partners with) may govern effectively. Any advice for 
 
 
 143. 460 U.S. 780 (1983). 
 144. For an example of this sort of back and forth, see Matt Gertz, Fox Defends Texas’ Voter ID 
Law With Fraud, MEDIA MATTERS (Mar. 13, 2012), http://mediamatters.org/research/2012/03/13/fox-
defends-texas-voter-id-law-with-fraud/184282. 
 145. See TAMANAHA, supra note 6, at 66.
 
 146. See Kim, supra note 4, at 404.  
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how to minimize rancor and dissensus is both imperative and appropriate 
in mediating the polity’s perception of the court.  
While it is reassuring that the court system can be sustained through 
this crisis of neutrality, the underlying logic of the movement pushes 
towards an inevitable resolution of this dichotomy. The naïve realist 
insight should influence the appointment processes in predictable ways. 
Appointments to the higher courts have often been contentious, but most 
appointments to the lower courts in the federal judiciary have been used as 
a form of political patronage, not to advance a specific policy agenda.
147
 
However, the promise to appoint ideologically sympathetic judges can be 
a tool when building political coalitions.
148
 In fact, there is evidence that 
this
 
strategy has been in use ever since Reagan.
149
 Some critics dismiss this 
reality as inconsequential, suggesting that Presidents are likely to pick 
judges who maintain viewpoints that align with their own.
150
 However, 
this politicization of the Court is reinforced by the naïve realist insight that 
such appointment behavior works and is not dependent on judges who are 
willing to make up the law in an overtly political fashion. Simply seeing 
the law with Liberal/Conservative eyes is enough.
151
 Thus, the battle to 
impose legal orthodoxy by a temporary political majority may be achieved 
through the law by picking ideologues to pack the bench.
152
 
D. But Nevertheless! The Implications of Cynical Logic 
Cynicism leaves untouched the level of ideological fantasy—the level 
on which ideology “structures our effective, real social relationships.”153 
Ideological fantasy structures what we do; it is the way the social reality is 
perceived, and not some external influence on what we know or think.
154
 
Cynicism is one of the ways we blind ourselves to the structured power of 
 
 
 147. TAMANAHA, supra note 6. at 175–85.
 
 148. Id. at 178–88.
 
 149. Id. at 181.
 
 150. Lammon, supra note 2, at 282–85.
 
 151. See Editorial, Politics and the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2012, at SR10, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/05/opinion/sunday/politics-and-the-supreme-court.html (last 
visited May 13, 2013) (arguing that the 2012 election will determine the makeup of future courts, thus 
having tremendous import on the law’s direction); Editorial, The Court and the Next President, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 28, 2011, at A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/29/opinion/the-supreme-
court-and-the-next-president.html (last visited May 13, 2013) (noting that had John Kerry been elected 
in 2004, that John Roberts and Samuel Alito would not have been nominated to the Court and 
hypothesizing that therefore the Citizens United decision would not have happened). 
 152. TAMANAHA, supra note 6, at 178–88.
 
 153. ŽIŽEK, IDEOLOGY, supra note 10, at 30, 45.
 
 154. Id.
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ideological fantasy.
155
 Cynicism is how jurists are able to reconcile the 
competing narratives about judicial decision-making. 
Law students are told a fictional story that judges used to decided cases 
by looking to a closed system of laws for the rule that applied to the case 
at hand. Then, students are told that this story is an illusion and judges 
really make decisions by looking at a number of factors, the law being one 
of those factors. This realism has come to be the ideologically dominant 
understanding of judicial decision-making.
156
 Naïve realism adds to this by 
acknowledging that there are factors that judges do not know they are 
considering when they make their decisions—that at least a part of their 
decision is driven by unconscious biases. With these reveleations comes 
the cynical distance between how judges “really decide cases” and the 
professed belief in legal formalism. Judges have come to know very well 
that their formalist rhetoric in decision-making masks a more realist 
approach to the law. In this way, the cynical injunction to profess a belief 
in legal formalism, but understand that decisions are made based on one’s 
situational dispositions, has come to order our social reality. This, we are 
told, is how judges act. 
An important and unique feature of ideology is that it locates the 
subject within the social fabric.
157
 How one experiences the world 
structures one’s understanding of one’s place in society (i.e., as an 
autonomous consumer, legal subject, king, or judge).
158
 It is a peculiar 
function of ideology that it imposes, without appearing to do so, what is 
considered to be obvious as being obvious. It defines what we cannot fail 
to recognize as obvious. It is ideology that generates the inevitable and 
natural reaction of crying out (either aloud or in the “still, small voice of 
conscience”): “That’s obvious! That’s right! That’s true!”159 Ideology is 
the mental structure that “minds the gap” between the knowledge (real) 
and belief (symbolic).
160
 In a way, it conflates belief with knowledge.  
When one is aware of this gap, but maintains it nonetheless, that is 
cynical. Cynicism is a “but nevertheless” logical connection between 
 
 
 155. Id. at 32–33.
 
 156. LEE EPSTINE, WILLIAM M. LANDES, RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL 
JUDGES 26–30 (2013). 
 157. ŽIŽEK, IDEOLOGY, supra note 10, at 38. 
 158. See generally Louis Althusser, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, in LENIN AND 
PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS (Ben Brewster trans., Monthly Review Press 1971). This concept is 
probably most simply illustrated with Althusser’s understanding of ideology: 1) there is no practice 
except by and in an ideology, and 2) there is no ideology except by the subject and for subjects. 
 159. ŽIŽEK, IDEOLOGY, supra note 10, at 38. 
 160. SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, FOR THEY KNOW NOT WHAT THEY DO: ENJOYMENT AS A POLITICAL 
FACTOR 241 (1991) [hereinafter ŽIŽEK, FOR THEY KNOW NOT]. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol5/iss2/4
  
 
 
 
 
2013] CYNICAL REALISM AND JUDICIAL FANTASY 319 
 
 
 
 
belief and knowledge when the gap is recognized. As applied, we can see 
that it is cynical to maintain an “inner distance” from the “external ritual” 
of applying the law as though it were a formalist coherent whole, yet 
continuing to partake in the “external ritual” of “legal analysis” to 
maintain the front.
161
 It is “obvious” that formalism is not true, but 
nevertheless judges continue to engage in formalist analysis (at least on 
paper) when answering legal questions. 
To fully understand the power of cynical ideology and how it 
undermines the relationship between the Law and the subject, it is 
necessary to first appreciate the way symbolism structures our relationship 
with authority and how a cynical judiciary fits within the social fabric.
162
 
1. The Mystique of the Institution 
Traditional authority is based on charismatic power, symbolic ritual, 
and the form of the “institution” as such.163 The traditional person holding 
power in such a relationship as could be personally dishonest and rotten, 
but when a person adopts the insignia of “authority,” that individual 
experiences a kind of mystic transubstantiation.
164
 When the Judge qua 
Judge speaks, it is the Law itself that speaks through him, and in this 
capacity he has the ability to compel obedience.
165
 For an example, take 
the trial of Socrates. Socrates understood that the judge was acting out of 
fault and vindictiveness, but Socrates did not want to flee judgment since 
the “spirit of the Law” itself must remain inviolate.166 He sacrificed 
himself to the Law; not to the judge. The spirit of the Law thus dwells in 
the symbolic rituals that constitute the institution of the Law, not in the 
rottenness of the momentary bearer.
167
  
However, this traditional authority realizes itself as actual only in its 
potential or symbolic state.
168
 The real authority of the judiciary is in 
organizing the power of the Law to compel obedience, and not in the 
coercive power exercised by the judge over the individual parties who 
 
 
 161. Id. at 241–44. 
 162. Id. at 249. Examples include king/president to subject, master to servant, employer to 
employee, father (or mother) to child, or other hierarchical structure where one is the dominant and the 
other must submit to authority. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id.  
 165. Id.  
 166. Id.  
 167. Id.  
 168. Id. at 250–51. 
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happen to find themselves before him.
169
 The judiciary’s power and 
authority are ultimately founded in its symbolic position within our 
ideological landscape and are accepted on trust.
170
 When that power fails 
to live up to the trust placed in it, the judiciary’s authority is still supported 
by the logic that “if he knew” then “he would set things right.”171 As in, “if 
the judge knew I was being held contrary to the dictates of the law, then he 
would set things right without delay.”172 This formalism preserves the 
belief that the Law is the authority, rather than the individual actors who 
come to embody it. At its ideal, this is how the Law operates. In order to 
maintain this mystique, the judge should employ the Law in a way that is 
neutral, fair, just, and so forth.  
2. The Manipulative Authority  
The second mode of authority is based not on the performative power 
of the symbolic ritual, but directly on the manipulation of its subjects.
173
 In 
this mode of authority, individuals take part in a social game where the 
goal is to deceive the other side in order to exploit both naivety and 
credulity.
174
 In this game, the actors “wear social masks” and “play their 
roles” as manipulative imposters who do not take their social roles 
seriously, but instead play to “make an impression on the other.”175  
This is the basic attitude of “cynical manipulation.”176 The cynic seeks 
to exploit the naivety of the subject by using the gap between the “real” 
and the “symbolic” by creating and maintaining that distance, as illustrated 
 
 
 169. In fact, if one steps back and understand the reality of the judicial branch one realizes just 
how impotent the judiciary is. By design, the judiciary does not have the power to execute the laws that 
it shapes (or makes)—that power is left to the executive branch—or the power to raise its own army or 
legion of Marshalls as it is dependent on the legislative branch to fund its operations. When one 
realizes that the power of the judiciary is solely this power to shape the Law—to lend legitimacy to the 
actions of Congress and the President, one realizes its awesome force compared with the power of the 
purse and the sword. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 170. ŽIŽEK, FOR THEY KNOW NOT, supra note 160, at 250. 
 171. Id. Interestingly, this role appears to be the most important function of the habeas corpus 
petition. It is a device that preserves this hope that the Law will set things right in the face of the 
failure of individuals involved in the case. Therefore, even the stranger who is unjustly convicted of a 
crime he did not do, and who spends decades in jail because of it, can still maintain a faith in the Law 
to set things straight as opposed to enact one of his other choices—attempting to escape, starting riots, 
murdering guards, or engaging in general anarchy to tear down what would be perceived as an unjust 
and unfair system. 
 172. Id.  
 173. Id. at 251. 
 174. Id.  
 175. Id.  
 176. Id.  
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above. While cynics claim that authority (in its symbolic form) is a fiction, 
it is a fiction that has the power to regulate our behavior. As such, it serves 
as a perfect tool to manipulate individuals’ behavior.177 Thus, the cynic 
maintains the law as authority as a mask to cover up the reality of money, 
power, or influence.
178
 The cynic creates a external distance between his 
(secret) knowledge and his projected belief with the aim of using that 
distance to manipulate the subject.
179
  
However, the cynic often overlooks that we are naked only beneath our 
clothes; as in, the “naked reality” is sustained only by the symbolic 
fiction.
180
 By manipulating the law to serve their selfish interest, they 
undermine the value of the law’s symbolic authority. From a subject’s 
perspective, this sort of cynical manipulation of the law only works until 
its power is brought to bear on that entity.
181
 The house of cards stands 
only until it falls.
182
 While the Law may be cynically manipulated to serve 
some interest for a while, ultimately the discovery that the Law is being 
used cynically destroys the credibility and legitimacy of those who use it 
as such.  
3. Totalitarian Authority  
This cynical manipulation takes on a different dimension, however, 
when the use of the law as a means to an end is employed to achieve some 
result bigger than individual enjoyment. When authority is based on the 
fiction that the authority figure is himself made of some “special stuff,” 
cut from a special mold, or the “direct embodiment of the Will of 
History,” the authority can be appropriately identified as totalitarian.183 
While at the level of knowledge the believers may “know very well” that 
they are people just like all others, they nonetheless believe themselves to 
 
 
 177. Id. “[P]hrases about values, honour, honesty are all empty words, they serve only to deceive 
the suckers.” Id. at 252. 
 178. Id.  
 179. Id. at 252. The cynic, when confronted with illegal enrichment (say robbery or fraud) reacts 
by saying that legal enrichment is a lot more effective and, moreover, is protected by the Law. “As 
Bertolt Brecht puts it in his Threepenny Opera: ‘what is robbery of a bank compared to the founding 
of a new bank?’” ŽIŽEK, IDEOLOGY, supra note 10, at 30. 
 180. ŽIŽEK, FOR THEY KNOW NOT, supra note 160, at 251. 
 181. Id. (“The efficacy of the fiction takes its revenge on him when a coincidence of the fiction 
with reality occurs: he then performs as ‘his own sucker.’”) 
 182. See Jack Abramoff. Times Topic: Jack Abramoff, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2010), http://topics 
.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/a/jack_abramoff/index.html (last visited Feb. 12, 
2012).  
 183. ŽIŽEK, FOR THEY KNOW NOT, supra note 160, at 251. 
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be special figures that exude special power.
184
 While at one level they may 
fully acknowledge that the symbolic fiction is false, they retain the mask 
of symbolic authority because the totalitarian party mission requires taking 
advantage of all sources of symbolic authority. 
E. Let the Emperor Keep His Clothes! 
The differences between these three modes of authority can be 
examined through a critical reading of the Hans Christian Andersen’s tale 
The Emperor’s New Clothes.185 The “demasking” gesture of critical 
studies can often be compared to the phrase uttered by the child—“but he 
has nothing on at all!”186 In the story, the Emperor has been swindled into 
believing that he is buying a “new suit” that has the ability to distinguish 
between clever people and stupid ones.
187
 In that regard, only those who 
can see the suit are truly worthy of their post, while those who do not see it 
are unworthy of their positions. The suit, of course, does not exist. 
However, the whole kingdom is, perhaps not surprisingly, afraid of being 
condemned as stupid for failing to see the suit. Thus, the entire kingdom 
praises the suit as the most beautiful clothing ever made. First, the 
Emperor’s advisors lie by saying it is beautiful. Then the Emperor himself 
is exposed to the ploy, but continues to maintain the belief that it is 
beautiful. Finally, the whole kingdom is exposed to the emperor’s 
nakedness and the kingdom cheered at how beautiful the suit is. This 
illusion only comes crashing down at the end of the story when a child 
points out the obvious—of course!—the Emperor has nothing on at all.188 
This final act is traditionally considered to be a moral liberating gesture; 
the innocent can expose the truth for what it is.  
The Emperor’s New Clothes has two take-aways that are relevant to 
this Note. First, it illustrates the difference between cynical logic and 
totalitarian logic to demonstrate how each would respond.
189
 The 
Emperor’s clothes stand in for his traditional authority as Emperor—the 
garments of symbolism that give him his power.
190
 The cynical response is 
the one shown by the Emperor’s advisors. Each advisor knows there are 
 
 
 184. Id.  
 185. HANS CHRISTIAN ANDERSEN, A TREASURY OF HANS CHRISTIAN ANDERSON 79–83 (Erik 
Christian Haugaard trans., Barnes & Noble Books 1993). 
 186. Id. at 83. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. ŽIŽEK, FOR THEY KNOW NOT, supra note 160, at 252. 
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no clothes, but nevertheless praise the garment as beautiful to protect his 
own self-interest (in not looking stupid).
191
 They let the Emperor expose 
his nakedness to the polity because they do not see it as problematic. They 
know that beneath the Emperor’s clothes he is always naked.192 They 
believe that the clothes are merely trappings; the power of the Emperor is 
in the physical, coercive power the Emperor may wield, not in his 
symbolic authority.
193
 In contrast, the totalitarian response would not be to 
protect the individual self-interest, but instead to protect the power of the 
ruling party. The fact that the Emperor exposes his nakedness to the polity 
becomes the reason to come together and work for the “cause” 
(maintaining the Emperor’s power despite his nakedness).194  
The catastrophic consequences of such a liberating gesture on society 
as a whole are lost in the traditional narrative.
195
 One wishes to discard the 
unnecessary hypocrisy and pretense that the “new suit” represents. 
However, after the emperor is exposed as naked, the very community 
sustained by the Emperor disintegrates.
196
 When his symbolic authority 
has been denounced as illusory en masse, isn’t his ability to govern also 
undermined?  
Applying this to judicial decision-making, the “Rule of Law” is the 
Emperor, and judges are the advisors. For the judge who accepts the naïve 
realist insight that the symbolic authority supporting the Rule of Law is a 
fallacy, it is theoretically possible that his response will fall into one of 
three camps. First, the responses can be cynical. While judges 
acknowledge that symbolic authority of the law is illusory, they 
nevertheless believe that they can use that authority to gain some 
advantage.
197
 This advantage can be achieved by manipulating the law in a 
way that serves one’s personal goals.198 Second, the response could be 
totalitarian. Under such a response, even though the symbolic authority of 
 
 
 191. Id.  
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. ŽIŽEK, IDEOLOGY, supra note 10, at 36. 
 196. Id. at 36. 
 197. Id. 
 198. See EPSTINE, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES, supra note 156, at 30–47. For example, as 
a young practitioner I might make connections with prominent political persons and demonstrate that I 
can formulate specific ideas about what the Law should be in a way that supports an interest of 
theirs—such as advocating for the expansion of the business judgment rule or belief that the first 
amendment extends to corporate donations to political campaigns. Then, when a spot for federal judge 
opens up, I am promoted as a viable candidate because I have adopted such business friendly 
positions, gaining for myself the power and prestige of being a life-time tenured federal judge and 
benefiting those who were able to use my appointment to raise campaign funds. 
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the law is illusory, the law is used as a means of protecting the “cause.”199 
This is done because the movement, the party, or the will of history must 
be actualized, and to do so all available sources of power, including the 
law must be used to their utmost advantage.
200
 Third, and perhaps most 
radically, the judges could work to preserve the mystique of the rule of 
law by trying to judge in a neutral way, without bias. In that way, the rule 
of law may keep its clothes.  
By stating that judges are in fact political, as political scientists have 
articulated in the attitudinal model, researchers hope to draw our attention 
to how the judiciary is used as a political arm. If the plot line is read in this 
way, the cynical response, as advised by Lammon and Kahan, suggests 
ways to protect the social order from catastrophic effects by realizing that 
judges are inescapably biased along ideological lines.
201
 So long as the 
Law’s nakedness is covered up, this cynical distance can be maintained to 
the insider’s advantage. This reasoning is further justified, not only 
because this sort of bias only appears in some decisions, but also because 
when it does appear it is most likely because of unconscious cognitive 
functions rather than some overt plot to control the Law. This 
understanding eases the apprehension of those individuals who recognize 
how the Law’s naked authority is being manipulated—those who may 
recognize that this manipulation is preferable to the alternative of tearing 
down the Law’s symbolic authority.  
The fear, however, is that this approach will ultimately fail as well—by 
creating this distance between the symbolic power of the Law and its 
actual operation, the door is opened for totalitarian logic to work its way 
into the judicial process. The more the Law is politicized, the more it is 
obscured from those who are fighting for the “cause” that the goal of their 
movement is simply power itself.
202
 The winners within a totalitarian 
society—the totalitarian subjects—would seek to employ the Law as a 
 
 
 199. ŽIŽEK, FOR THEY KNOW NOT, supra note 160, at 252. 
 200. Id. For example, as a true believer in the federalist cause, I advocate and develop arguments 
for limiting the reach of the federal commercial clause power to maintain a realm of independence for 
the states. Recognizing the ultimate illusion of the Law, I work to elect ideological sympathizers into 
the legislature and executive branches who will then, reciprocally, appoint me to the bench so that we 
can all work towards limiting the reach of the federal government—the Cause of our ideological in-
group. The exact same thing can be said for the liberal who believes in expanding the reach of the 
federal government to promote an elitist liberal agenda. Similarly, one could view the “government by 
injunction” response to railroad strikes by federal judges like William Howard Taft as a totalitarian 
response to shifting labor relations with the cause of protecting the existing social order. See William 
E. Forbath, Government by Injunction, in LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR 
MOVEMENT 59 (1989). 
 201. See supra notes 47–68. 
 202. ŽIŽEK, FOR THEY KNOW NOT, supra note 160, at 252. 
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means to achieving the “cause.” The rest must then become accustomed to 
naked legal authority being used to protect a political victory. 
Instead of conceding that the rule of Law and unbiased decision-
making is impossible, we should accept the third response and thereby let 
the rule of law “keep its clothes.” The symbolic authority of the judiciary 
is derived from its impartiality and legalist foundation. Even if an 
individual judge acts in a cynical or totalitarian way, the institution of the 
judiciary is maintained so long as the judges’ robes continue to hold their 
symbolic value. That symbolic value is only maintained through a 
continued belief that the judge can and will rule in an impartial way. Only 
in this way are the subjects free from political tyranny imposed by one 
group’s idea for how society should be organized or from exposure to the 
cynical manipulation by the in-group. To protect their symbolic authority, 
judges must actively try to live up to their ideal—the power 
conceptualized in the neutral, independent judiciary. Judges must work to 
clothe the rule of Law in earnest. To do so, judges must be reassured that 
they can, in fact, try to be neutral in making judicial decisions. 
IV. NAÏVE REALISM IS NOT INEVITABLE 
Progress is impossible without change, and those who cannot 
change their minds cannot change anything. 
—George Bernard Shaw 
To sustain our historic understanding of the judicial role, we must 
confront the problem of how judicial ideologies are determined and 
whether they can be influenced in such a way as to maintain a non-
instrumental use of the law. A different perspective on cognitive 
psychology and a renewed focus on professional and craft norms can help 
to ground a judge ideologically in his unique and independent role outside 
of the political branches. Judges are in a unique position to resist 
competing political visions. To do so, judges must cultivate an 
independent ideology that is grounded in traditionally accepted craft 
norms and rational analysis of facts and law. The goal of this ideology is 
to sustain the social order by maintaining the rule of Law as a goal of, and 
ideal in, American jurisprudence.  
In order to cultivate an independent judicial ideology, a more detailed 
and richer account of decision-making would be useful for this inquiry. 
The eminent psychologist Daniel Khaneman illustrates how the mind 
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processes content and makes decisions within the framework of this two-
system approach.
203
 He borrows from other noted psychologists and paints 
a picture of “two selves”—a “System 1 self” and a “System 2 self.” 
System 1 operations are “typically fast, automatic, effortless, associative, 
implicit (not available to introspection) and often emotionally charged; 
they are also governed by habit and are therefore difficult to control or 
modify.”204 System 2 operations, on the other hand, are “slower, serial, 
effortful, more likely to be consciously monitored and deliberately 
controlled; they are also relatively flexible and potentially rule 
governed.”205 
This split between the systems is hierarchical, with System 2 being 
built on top of System 1. One of the main tasks of System 2 is to “monitor 
and control thoughts and actions ‘suggested’ by System 1.”206 Individuals 
differ, often dramatically, in the ease with which they engage in System 2 
thinking, as “[i]t is now a well-established proposition that both self-
control and cognitive effort are forms of mental work.”207 The willingness 
to engage in System 2 thinking reflects the individuals’ ability to control 
their minds and exhibit the characteristics of intelligence and rationality.
208
 
Researchers Keith Stanovich and Richard West, who introduced the terms 
System 1 and System 2, have used this model to distinguish between 
intelligence and rationality.
209
 Those with high intelligence are able to 
think slowly and do highly demanding computations, yet are not immune 
from biases.
210
 To avoid biases, one must be rational—a concept 
Kahneman labels “engaged.”211 To be “engaged” is to be constantly 
reflecting on the intuitive answers suggested by System 1 thinking.
212
 
However, many of us have a lazy System 2, one that will not engage in the 
mental work of checking every mental impression and will simply seek to 
confirm the intuitive answer provided by System 1.
213
 
 
 
 203. See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011) [hereinafter 
KAHNEMAN, THINKING] 
 204. Daniel Kahneman, A Perspective on Judgment and Choice, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 697–72 
(2003).
 
 205. Id.  
 206. KAHNEMAN, THINKING, supra note 203, at 44.
 
 207. Id. at 41.
 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at 48–49. 
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Kahneman never uses the term “ideology,” yet he implies that ideology 
is a System 1 process. He states, “The measure for success for System 1 is 
the coherence of the story it manages to create.”214 Naturally, System 1 
does not seek to incorporate knowledge that it does not have. As 
Kahneman puts it, “what you see is all there is, System 1 is radically 
insensitive to the quality and the quantity of the information that gives rise 
to impressions and intuitions.”215 Thus, “the combination of a coherence-
seeking System 1 with a lazy System 2 implies that System 2 will enforce 
many intuitive beliefs, which closely reflect the impressions generated by 
System 1.”216  
A. Craft Norms and Ideological Fantasy 
The level of ideological fantasy is located in System 1 thinking. System 
1 processes are shaped by continued practice and developed expertise in a 
field or subject.
217
 In the legal context, judges have developed and 
complicated craft norms that determine the acceptable ways of going about 
formulating legal decisions. As Pauline Kim argues:  
Judges may have a variety of legal preferences regarding matters 
such as the appropriate mode of interpreting statutes, or the 
relevance of foreign legal materials, and these preferences may vary 
from judge to judge. But their decisions are also guided by a set of 
widely shared norms—some of which are formulated as legal 
rules—regarding their role in the judicial hierarchy. One 
fundamental and widely accepted norm requires that lower federal 
court judges follow precedent established by a court directly in line 
above them in the judicial hierarchy. Adherence to this norm offers 
a straightforward explanation of why lower courts comply with 
superior court precedent, even that with which they disagree.
218
  
This well-developed body of legal preferences and norms shapes the way 
judges think and act about making decisions within the judicial context. 
This is precisely ideology’s real aim: to compel us to follow a certain 
attitude demanded by it.
219
 This attitude can simply be maintaining the rule 
 
 
 214. Id. at 85.
 
 215. Id. at 86.
 
 216. Id. 
 
 217. Id. at 241–44. 
 218. Kim, supra note 4, at 404. 
 219. ŽIŽEK, IDEOLOGY, supra note 10, at 84 (noting that the real goal of ideology is simply to 
maintain the consistency of the ideological attitude itself). 
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of law or some third, independent ideological attitude such as enacting the 
policy preference of one party, protecting corporate interests, expanding 
individual rights, or maintaining a Federalist Society-friendly judicial 
record. As Kim points out, “judges’ preferences regarding legal outcomes 
might be understood as an ‘attitude’ in much the same way that . . . 
political preferences” are in the attitudinal model.220 This attitude can 
come from the socialization process involved in professional training or 
from the other judges that judges have been previously exposed to.
221
 It 
can also come from a judge acting in her own self-interest in ensuring 
respect for herself or for the judiciary more generally, or from some 
inherent utility from playing the game as it is meant to be played.
222
 So 
long as the attitude that motivates the judge points in a direction that 
employs these means, the rule of Law may be maintained at the 
ideological level.  
B. Thinking Slowly about Judicial Decisions 
Thus, when judges are initially presented with “facts” of a case, they 
“continuously monitor what is going on outside and inside the mind, and 
continuously generat assessments of various aspects of the situation 
without specific intention and with little or no effort.”223 To become more 
neutral decision-makers, judges must engage in System 2 thinking when 
reaching non-intuitive answers to difficult questions—especially to 
questions that must predict, ex ante, the implications of certain decisions 
before a judge. “Obvious” understandings are the problem. While not 
inherently a product of laziness—it is difficult to be suspicious of 
something you consider obvious—these obvious answers are products of 
ideological fantasy constructing a seamless understanding of how the 
world is and should be, and therefore these answers may be logically 
suspect.
224
 Although “[s]ignificant effort is required to find the relevant 
reference category, estimate the baseline prediction, and evaluate the 
quality of the evidence,” it is essential for judges to overcome their 
intuitive predictions about how a case (or fact) should be interpreted.
225
 
This challenge is, in a word, “complicating.” As Kahneman explains,  
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A characteristic of unbiased predictions is that they permit the 
prediction of rare or extreme events only when the information is 
very good. If you expect your predictions to be of modest validity, 
you will never guess an outcome that is either rare or far from the 
mean. If your predictions are unbiased, you will never have the 
satisfying experience of correctly calling an extreme case. You will 
never be able to say, “I thought so!” when your best student in law 
school becomes a Supreme Court justice, or when a start-up that 
you thought very promising eventually becomes a major 
commercial success.
226
 
Kahanemen explains that a “preference for unbiased predictions is 
justified if all errors of prediction are treated alike, regardless of their 
direction.”227 This is precisely the sort of error distribution that would be 
appropriate for judges to strive towards. To maintain such impartiality in 
judicial decision-making, unbiased predictions and judgments must be 
regarded as the ideal. Rules based on reason, rather than those based upon 
the biased opinions of the judge, should govern society.
228
  
Legal education is designed to provide lawyers and judges with the 
cognitive tools to engage in reasoned System 2 logic. Professional craft 
norms emphasize detailed articulation of the reasons and principles behind 
a judge’s decision. Engaging in this sort of slow, reasoned, and logical 
System 2 analysis requires work and patience. But this is something that 
judges are entirely capable of handling if they so choose.  
C. Structural Suggestions for Protecting Rule of Law Norms 
For an independent judicial ideology to clothe the rule of Law through 
a more rational and deliberative process, judges must possess substantive 
and procedural legal rules that minimize the ability for bias to play a part 
in decision-making. That is, for an independent ideology that tells judges 
to think slowly, be more rational, and protect the rule of Law, there must 
be clear rules for applying facts to law so that judges may make a neutral 
decision. A return to Crawford demonstrates how this might be 
implemented.  
 
 
 226. Id.
 
 227. Id.
 
 228. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). The independence of the judiciary has, 
from its conception, been an essential element in to “secure a steady, upright, and impartial 
administration of the laws.” 
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In Crawford, the key to the split at the Supreme Court level was the 
very muddy balancing approach known as the Anderson-Burdick test.
229
 
The test required the Court to balance the burdens imposed on the plaintiff 
against the State’s interest in the election administration law to determine 
whether there existed a constitutional violation.
230
 But, rather than a 
simple balancing test, the Court must also factor in “the character and 
magnitude of the asserted injury to the First and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate against the precise interests put 
forward by the State as justification for the burden imposed by its rule, 
taking into consideration the extent to which those interests make it 
necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.”231 According to the various 
opinions in Crawford, if the restriction is severe, meaning if it goes 
“beyond the merely inconvenient,”232 or if it is invidiously 
discriminatory
233
 then “strict scrutiny” is applied. But, according to Justice 
Stevens, “[r]ather than applying any ‘litmus test’ that would neatly 
separate valid from invalid restrictions,” the Court “must identify and 
evaluate the interests put forward by the State as justifications for the 
burden imposed by its rule,” in order to “make the ‘hard judgment’ that 
our adversary system demands.”234 This approach suggests that, if the state 
interest is “sufficiently weighty” to justify the burden, then a “balancing 
test” should be used.235 According to Justice Scalia, a litmus test approach 
is appropriate, and if the burden is “ordinary and widespread . . . , 
requiring a ‘nominal effort’ of everyone,” or is “reasonable” and 
“nondiscriminatory,” then a deferential “important regulatory interests” 
standard is employed by the Court to (most likely) uphold the Law.
236
 This 
standard applies “even when their burdens purportedly fall 
disproportionately on a protected class.”237 
This amorphous, ambiguous, and apoplectically designed standard 
serves to purposely obfuscate the legal analysis to mask an end that the 
justices seek to protect. Justice Stevens found the burdens not severe 
enough to meet the threshold and the state interest to be “sufficiently 
 
 
 229. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992). 
 230. Burdick, 504 U.S., at 441.  
 231. Id. at 434 (citing Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789). 
 232. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 204 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 233. Id. at 189. 
 234. Id. at 190. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. at 204 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 237. Id. at 207 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted). 
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weighty” to justify the burden.238 Justice Scalia claimed the burdens 
imposed here are “ordinary and widespread,” so the State meets its burden 
by articulating an important regulatory interest (deterring voter fraud) even 
if it fails to substantiate the need for the anti-fraud statute.
239
 Justice Souter 
found the burdens severe and also found that the State failed to 
substantiate the need to impose them.
240
 Justice Breyer came to a similar 
finding, while noting that the less-restrictive laws in place in Florida and 
Georgia would be more narrowly tailored alternatives that Indiana could 
have implemented.
241
 The standard is so muddy that there is a lack of 
consensus regarding its boundaries and a difference of opinion concerning 
how the standard should be applied. In the midst of this chaos, each 
individual’s understanding of the burdens and interests dominate their 
approach to the facts in Crawford. Therefore, implicit bias, motivated 
reasoning, and identity protective cognition could determine the individual 
opinions of the case. The lead opinion by Justice Stevens seems to strive 
for a middle way in upholding the law from a facial attack, while leaving 
open the possibility for an as-applied challenge by a burdened litigant. 
Yet, the failure to muster the will to fashion a coherent and administrable 
rule served as a failure to secure the rule of Law in election administration 
cases. This standard, or lack thereof, dooms us to ideological determinant 
decisions in election administration cases. 
Thus, taking the constructive approach laid out in this Note, future 
research and judicial opinion drafting should be made with an eye towards 
creating coherent, administrable rules that minimize the room for an 
individual judge’s bias to influence decisions in these cases. This goal can 
be accomplished by creating strictly applicable rules that minimize the 
“hard decisions” that judges must make and instead requiring simple rules 
that lead to clear outcomes. In a phrase, emphasize crystals over mud in 
cases where bias tends to play a part. By identifying the types of decisions 
that tend to be biased and by recognizing the underlying legal rules that 
allow for this bias, scholars and judges can work to establish clear and 
administrable rules that would be more valuable to achieve the desired 
judicial end: protection of the rule of Law. Finding ways to change those 
legal rules to minimize judicial bias would provide a structured and 
productive way to deal with the implications of naïve legal realism.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
This Note attempts to inspire others to provide normative answers to 
our most pressing questions about how judges should make decisions. The 
last element to cementing a slow form of judicial analysis is to develop a 
motivating factor for why judges should engage in reasoned, rational 
analysis on top of a preference for legal opinions. It is here that the cynical 
logic of post-modern critique and moral skepticism has done the most 
damage to the “first principles” of analysis. Still, there remains one 
overriding principle that can be salvaged: sustainability. That guiding 
principle is the maintenance of the political, economic, environmental, 
social, and legal order. In that regard, it can serve as the guiding force for a 
well-respected, legitimate judiciary that strives to employ the law not as a 
means to some end, but as an end in itself. The method of achieving 
sustainability is simple: do not employ the law as a means to serve 
anything except its own end. Instead, strive to achieve a neutral set of rules 
that govern all of society in a way that is equitable, administrable, and just.  
The greatest problem facing this sort of sustainable decision-making 
today is the entrenched belief, on both sides of the political aisle, that there 
exists one right answer to important policy questions facing the nation. To 
overcome this inaccrurate belief, judges must truly change the way they 
see the world. Judges must begin to understand that the rule of Law itself 
is the most important value to maintain. We must not have a shortsighted 
view of history; rather we must understand that ideological extremism is a 
threat to liberty and freedom so long as those words should have any 
meaning. Fundamentalist, dogmatic faith to any party line is the most 
dangerous belief that can ingrain itself in the judiciary.  
To counteract that risk, judges must be encouraged to think slowly 
about judicial decision-making. They must cultivate an attitude in 
decision-making that will undermine any intuition to decide along 
expedient partisan political beliefs. The rule of Law has always been an 
ideal and is only realized as the ideological fantasy guiding judicial 
decision-making—but never as something that can actually be achieved. 
The intent of this Note was to show that service as a guide makes the rule 
of Law “real” in a very important sense. Even though rule of Law 
decision-making may be “impossible,” it is still an essential value that 
pushes those who hold tremendous power to overcome their intuitive 
biases and become the more neutral arbitrators upon which our concept of 
liberty depends..  
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